The Global Crisis: Are We Ready for Multiple Wars?

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What if the most important story today is not happening in one battlefield? Because on September 2, 2026, four seemingly separate developments are sending the same warning. A U.S. aircraft carrier has finally reached Thailand after 286 consecutive days at sea. An Iranian attack on a Saudi tanker has killed two Filipino sailors in the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and Ukraine are turning the Black Sea into an increasingly dangerous environment for commercial shipping — threatening a crucial artery for the world’s grain supply. And Washington is now urging NATO allies to prepare for the possibility that Russia could eventually attack a NATO member. These are not necessarily parts of one coordinated conflict. But together, they reveal something much more consequential: The world's strategic waterways, alliances and military resources are being stretched simultaneously. The first signal comes from Thailand. On September 2, the USS Abraham Lincoln finally entered Laem Chabang after an extraordinary deployment that began in November 2025. The carrier had spent 286 days at sea, with roughly 5,000 sailors and Marines aboard. It was the ship's first full port visit since the deployment began. The strike group had spent nearly seven months operating in the U.S. Central Command area during the war with Iran. The significance is not simply that an American aircraft carrier needed a vacation. It is what the deployment tells us about military endurance. Aircraft carriers are designed for long deployments. But almost nine months without a full port stop is extraordinary. Reports have described shortages of fresh food, plumbing problems and concerns about deteriorating morale and mental health among personnel. Rear Admiral Robert Loughran described the Thailand visit as an opportunity for sailors and Marines to “rest and recharge.” And that phrase matters. Because behind every aircraft carrier is a much larger question: How long can a military sustain simultaneous commitments across multiple theaters? Now move thousands of miles west. The Strait of Hormuz is once again becoming a test of that same question. On Monday, September 1, two tankers carrying Saudi crude were attacked near Khasab, Oman. One was the Saudi-flagged Sidr. The other was the Liberian-flagged Senegal Prosperity. Both had loaded roughly two million barrels of crude at Saudi Arabia's Juaymah terminal. But the story became even more serious on September 2. Saudi Arabia said an Iranian attack on the Sidr killed two Filipino sailors. The deaths transform what might otherwise have been another shipping incident into a direct human and geopolitical escalation. And there is a larger vulnerability here. Hormuz is not simply a piece of water on a map. It is one of the world's most important energy chokepoints. If commercial vessels begin to believe that passing through the strait carries an unacceptable risk, the consequences don't stop at the coastline. Insurance costs rise. Shipping becomes slower. Energy prices can rise. And governments are forced to decide whether they are willing to deploy military power to protect commercial shipping. That is exactly where the presence — and exhaustion — of naval forces becomes important. But here's where it gets interesting. At almost the same time, another major maritime artery is under pressure. The Black Sea. Russia and Ukraine have increasingly targeted ports, vessels and infrastructure connected to maritime trade. The New York Times reports that attacks have left farmers facing severe disruption and raised the possibility of another global food shock. Other reporting indicates that more than 50 vessels were attacked in the Black Sea this summer. This is critical because Ukraine and Russia are not ordinary agricultural exporters. They are central players in global grain markets. When their ports and shipping routes become dangerous, the consequences can travel far beyond Eastern Europe. A farmer in southern Ukraine may struggle to export. A shipowner may demand higher insurance. A grain trader may seek alternative routes. And eventually, consumers thousands of miles away can feel the impact through food prices. This is why maritime warfare is so strategically important. You don't necessarily have to destroy every ship. You only have to make the route sufficiently dangerous. There is a historical parallel here. During the 1973 oil crisis, the world learned how quickly geopolitical conflict in one region could become an economic crisis everywhere else. The Black Sea and Hormuz are different situations. But the underlying principle is similar: Control of strategic transportation routes can become a weapon far beyond the battlefield. And this brings us to the fourth development — perhaps the most politically significant of all. Washington is now warning NATO. According to USA TODAY, U.S. officials are urging allies to train and invest as though Russia could eventually launch an attack against a NATO member. The report says leaked U.S. intelligence indicated Russia could potentially launch a limited assault — including a land incursion or cyberattack — against a NATO country within the next several years. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker declined to comment directly on the intelligence but emphasized vigilance, defense spending and weapons production. Notice the wording. Washington is not saying a Russian invasion of NATO is imminent. That distinction matters. And it leads to the first counterargument. Some will say: “Russia is already deeply committed to Ukraine. Why would Moscow deliberately attack NATO and trigger a much larger war?” That argument has logic. A direct attack on NATO would carry enormous risks for Russia. But the American warning does not necessarily depend on an imminent invasion. The concern is preparation. Military planners don't prepare only for wars they know will happen. They prepare for wars that become possible. The second counterargument is that NATO is stronger than Russia. That is also broadly true in conventional economic and military potential. NATO possesses enormous collective resources. But military power is not simply about the total number of tanks, aircraft or soldiers. It is about readiness, ammunition, logistics, industrial capacity and geography. And this is where the current situation becomes uncomfortable. The United States is simultaneously dealing with major commitments in the Middle East while maintaining its global military presence. The Abraham Lincoln spent months supporting operations in the Middle East before finally reaching Thailand. Europe is confronting Russia. Ukraine needs air-defense interceptors. And commercial shipping is increasingly exposed in two major maritime regions. So the question is not: Does NATO have enough power? The more difficult question is: Can that power be deployed quickly enough, in enough places, for long enough? And there is a third counterargument. Perhaps these events are completely unrelated. After all, Iran's conflict with the United States is separate from Russia's war against Ukraine. The Black Sea is not the Persian Gulf. And NATO's European security problem is not the same as Middle Eastern maritime security. That is true. There is no evidence that these four developments represent a single coordinated strategy. But they do share something. They compete for the same global resources. Ships. Aircraft. Missiles. Air defenses. Intelligence. Fuel. Industrial production. And military attention. That is the deeper story. What few people realize is that modern warfare increasingly resembles a network rather than a collection of isolated battlefields. A missile defense system deployed to protect one theater cannot simultaneously protect another. A carrier strike group spending months in the Middle East is not available elsewhere in exactly the same way. A commercial vessel avoiding the Black Sea may require another route. A European country purchasing large quantities of air-defense systems is competing for industrial capacity with another country doing the same. And every additional crisis increases the pressure. This is why the Abraham Lincoln matters beyond the Pacific. Its arrival in Thailand is not simply a photograph of a carrier pulling into port. It is also a reminder of the physical limits of military power. Even the world's most powerful navy has sailors who need rest. Ships require maintenance. Aircraft require parts. Weapons stocks must be replenished. And crews cannot remain at maximum operational tempo indefinitely. So what happens if these pressures continue? If attacks on shipping continue in Hormuz, governments may increase naval escorts. If Black Sea attacks intensify, grain exporters may search for alternative routes. If Russia's pressure on NATO increases, Europe will accelerate rearmament. And if the United States remains heavily committed in the Middle East, Washington may face harder choices about where to position its most valuable forces. None of these outcomes is inevitable. But together they create a strategic dilemma. Because deterrence depends partly on convincing adversaries that you have enough capability to respond. And deterrence becomes more complicated when multiple adversaries, multiple wars and multiple chokepoints demand attention at the same time. There is another lesson from history. During the Cold War, American strategy depended heavily on maintaining forces capable of responding across multiple theaters. But today's environment is different. The threats are more distributed. Iran can threaten maritime commerce. Russia can pressure Europe and attack infrastructure. Ukraine can disrupt Russian logistics. Cyber operations can cross borders without warning. And global trade depends on shipping routes that are physically vulnerable to relatively inexpensive weapons. The battlefield is no longer necessarily where armies meet. Sometimes the battlefield is a port. Sometimes it is a shipping lane. Sometimes it is a satellite network. And sometimes it is the industrial base thousands of miles behind the front. So when we look at the USS Abraham Lincoln arriving in Thailand after 286 days at sea, the two Filipino sailors killed aboard a Saudi tanker, the growing danger to Black Sea shipping and Washington's warning to NATO, we should resist the temptation to treat them as four unrelated headlines. They may not form one war. But they are symptoms of a world in which strategic capacity is being tested in several places at once. The real question is not whether the United States, NATO, Russia, Iran or Ukraine can handle one crisis. They probably can. The real question is what happens when several crises demand attention at the same time. Because the most dangerous moment may not be when one war becomes larger. It may be when multiple wars remain just small enough to continue — but large enough to consume the ships, weapons, money and attention needed to prevent the next one. And that is the strategic problem emerging behind today's headlines. The world may not be entering one global war. But it is increasingly operating under the pressures of multiple connected strategic crises. The question we should be asking now is not simply: “Where is the next war?” It is: “How many crises can the global security system absorb before something breaks?” This is Cobalt. The next war starts in space. Cobalt explains how. If you want to understand how today's conflicts are reshaping the future battlefield, subscribe to Cobalt.